THE ARMIES

Rome. The Roman army at the time of the battle at Cannae was a disciplined troop. The army was composed mostly of Roman citizens, with some interspersed units from subject territories. They used large shields, and organized in squares prior to combat. They used short, stabbing swords, short, stabbing spears, long pikes, and javelins. The square was organized with shieldmen in the first four ranks, and pikesmen and javelineers in the fifth through eighth ranks. Reserves, additional javelineers, slingers, and irregulars were held in the rear or on the right flank.

The Romans were armored in what for the time was considered heavy armor. This armored varied from troop to troop, and ran the gamut from greaves and helmet alone, through chain shirts, greaves, girdles, and helmets, to breastplates, greaves, braces, and helmets. The Roman soldier was issued, at a minimum, his helmet, his greaves, and his shield. Additional armor was to be purchased by the individual soldier.

Carthage. The Carthaginian army was composed in large part of Gothic mercenaries, rebels from Gaul and Northern Italy, and some African regulars. Arms ranged from long pikes, short stabbing swords and spears from Rome, to longer swords and axes from the Gothic tribesmen. The army was organized according to ethnicity (and thus by weapons and tactics). Having fought together under Hannibal, who stressed coordination, the units were much better at working together than might be supposed.

The Carthaginian army was armored more lightly than the Romans, in general. The Goths employed furs, brigantine, and chainmail armor. The Gauls were similar, though with a smattering of Roman greaves, braces, and girdles. The Africans were armored along the Roman line.

THE COMMANDERS

Rome. Having grown dissatisfied with the slow successes of Fabius, the Romans had transferred command of roughly 50,000 men to two consuls, L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro. Neither man had any experience with Hannibal's tactics, which were unorthodox and brilliant. Both consuls were aggressive, and eager to achieve the big success that had eluded Fabius for so long.

Carthage. Hannibal had proven very successful at embarassing the Romans throughout Spain. He had roused the Gaulic towns in Northern Italy, and incorporated many of their people into his army. He used unorthodox methods which surprised and confused his enemies. As an example, he drew the Romans from a garrison in the mountains by driving 2,000 oxen with burning faggots tied to their horns toward Fabius's camp. He employed elephants to smash through the tight Roman line. His tactics were very advanced, and relied on communication and coordination during battle. At the time, communication and coordination once battle had commenced were rare.

THE TERRAIN

Cannae is a town situated along the river Ofanto (Aufidus). The river takes a turn, and there is a flat plain in the bend of the river. The plain is bordered on one side by low hills. In the early mornings, fog often rises along the river, hiding the banks from view.

Hannibal lined up along the river, with his center bowed toward the advancing Romans. His cavalry was on the flanks, and hidden in the fog with African regulars. The Romans doubled up their ranks in the center, expecting to simply roll over the Carthaginians, pinning them against the river.

The Romans, believing they had the full measure of the Carthaginians, pressed the center hard. The Carthaginian center fell back, while the flanks held firm. The Romans, following their normal tactics, did not commit their cavalry initially. Rather, they began a slow flanking movement. Apparently, they expected that once the Carthaginian center was bowed, they could smash into the exposed flanks. They did not commit initially, since the flanks were not engaged in the beginning of the battle, and could have fought the Roman cavalry if they engaged too early. When the Carthaginian center had formed a "killing pocket", the cavalry and African regulars swept past the engaged Roman flank, surprising the Roman cavalry. Hannibal's cavalry swept the Roman cavalry from the field, and swept into the rear of the Roman line. The Roman flanks began turning and buckling as the cavalry went by, allowing the Africans to press them almost unhindered. In short order, the numerically superior Roman armor had been surrounded. Demoralized, disorganized, and surrounded, the Romans were crushed. Hannibal's force lost 6,000 to an estimated 40,000 Romans.

This uniques encirclement of a numerically superior force by a numerically inferior one was accomplished mostly by three factors: surprise, discipline, and coordination. First, the Romans were surprised by the onset of the cavalry from the fog. Second, when the Roman cavalry turned and fled, discipline kept the Carthaginian cavalry from carrying on after them. Rather, a token force continued the pursuit to keep the Roman horse out of the battle, while the main body turned and wheeled into the flank and rear of the Roman army. Third, the Carthaginian units acted in a coordinated fashion. The horse waited until the appropriate time to engage. The center bowed, while the flanks held, to channel the Roman force into the containment pocket. By contrast, the Romans fell to simply fighting as soon as contact was made with the enemy. They were thus completely unable to respond to the change in the tide of battle. They paid for it, too!

Back to Battle Studies by Dux