Background. Alexander the great was a Macedonian general at a time when small city states were common. Macedonia was on the rise, both politically and militarily, at the time that Alexander began his impressive campaigns.. His father, Phillip, had taken Macedonia from a small, little-respected republic, to a powerful nation demanding respect. Alexander continued this trend through brilliant leadership, statemanship, and unrelenting pursuit of his objectives.

Porus was an Indian general at a time when India was in a state of near-continual warfare. Porus was known as a capable general, thorough if not brilliant. He was careful, thoughtful, and intelligent. His experiences in India had taught him the careful husbanding of his resources.

The Macedonians. To call all of Alexander's army Macedonians is something of a misnomer. The only parts of his army that was truly Macedonian were the Companions. The other cavalry were from Greek allies, Greek mercenaries, and levys from conquered Indian lands. Mercenaries and Indians could not be trusted as much as the Greek allies could, so they were often put to the front where they could be driven into the enemy.

The Companions were elite "Cavalry Archers", who fought with a short bow, sword, and spear. The other cavalry fought with a somewhat longer sword than that used by the Comapnions, and with spears and javelins. The infantry was composed of three different types: the Phalanx, who fought with long (15-20') spears, the "grooms", who tended to the Phalanx and fought with swords, and the archers. The "archers" actually consisted of slingers, javelineers, and bowmen. Alexander's chariots were not involved in this battle.

All of Alexander's army was relatively lightly armored. Officers often had breastplates, greaves, and helmets. Most of the cavalry was outfitted with greaves and chainmail. The footsoldiers had a variety of armors, ranging from chainmail or some plates, to boiled leather (which was by far the most common). Most footsoldiers did not have helmets.

The Indians. The Indian army was, for the most part, armed and armored similarly to the Greeks. The biggest difference lies in the chariots and the use of elephants. Indian chariots were drawn by two to four horses, and were outfitted with many sharp spikes and blades all over their outer surfaces. They were manned by two to four men, using javelins, bows, and spears. Elephants were maddened beasts kept under poor control. Their primary use was in frightening the cavalry and destroying their discipline, and in charging through infantry.

It is interesting to note here that the elephant was much more a psychological weapon than a truly effective force. Everybody on the field was aware that these massive beasts had been trained to hate humans, and that to go near an elephant was likely to get one hurt. In actual combat, however, the elephants typically charged into masses of people, took a few injuries, and fled.

The Situation. Alexander was pushing into India, conquering territory and people for the Macedonians. He had come up to the river Hydaspes in late 331 BCE, where he was stymied by Porus. The river Hydaspes was deep and fast-flowing. From April to August the river was uncrossable due to runoff from the mountains nearby. Even in winter the river was a formidable obstacle. If he attempted to cross the river in front of Porus, Porus would slaughter him.

Alexander therefore began a long campaign of deceit and harassment. He brought corn to his camp from the surrounding lands, to indicate that he planned to winter in camp. He sent his cavalry up and down the river during the night, having them make a lot of noise and occasionally sounding the battle-cry. Porus responded at first by sending his elephants and cavalry to the apparent crossing point. Later, he got more complacent and tired of these antics, and sent only scouts to watch the river.

Meanwhile, Alexander was preparing a large number of boats and rafts near the Admana Island, in the middle of the river. The island was wooded, which provided cover for the operation. Near the head of the island was a smaller river on Alexander's side, which was wooded on both banks, as well, allowing storage of the boats as they were constructed.

When all was ready, Alexander crossed the river during the night, in the midst of a raging thunderstorm. Porus's first indication that Alexander had crossed in force was when his scouts came tearing back into camp, bloodied by their fight with the crossing force.

Porus still had a significant enemy force directly across the river from him, which he still needed to worry about. He could not simply march to deal with the crossing force. Therefore, he deployed his troops into battle formation where they were, allowing him to keep his eye on Craterus (who commanded the Greeks still across the river).

The Battle. Alexander had confidence in superior cavalry, and advanced ahead of his infantry. When he caught sight of the enemy, he halted his cavalry. It seemed clear from later developments that Porus could not see his cavalry. Alexander then employed a strategem which seems strange to most historians, but which should be familiar to many in the SCA - he tempted Porus to charge him with his cavalry.

He did this by sending his Companions toward his own right - a clear flanking move. Two other squadrons he sent to his left, hidden from view by a rise in the ground. Those squadrons went at a full run, skirting wide to Alexander's left and then coming back in toward his right. His main body of cavalry he sent directly toward the Indian left flank cavalry, moving slowly. In response to the apparently inferior cavalry threat to his left flank, Porus shifted all of his cavalry to the left flank and charged.

Historians do not understand the motivation for getting the Indians to charge for the simple reason that cavalry, in general, is only useful when charging. Moreover, usually one side or the other has an advantage and is doing the charging. They don't quite grasp that Alexander wanted the Indians to charge in order to fixate their attention.

When the Indians charged, the squadrons that had wheeled far into the field appeared in the flank and rear of the Indians, who were at full charge. The Indians could not stop their charge, and the Companions on their left prevented them from wheeling away from the flankers. Porus's cavalry was slaughtered, enveloped on three fronts before they made contact.

The Macedonian infantry took advantage of the pause while the cavalry stratagem was worked out to press forward. When they were in range, the javelineers, slingers, and archers went forward and began harassing the Indians. The Indians had the elephants out front, with infantry columns fitted into the gaps but held back behind the elephants. The archers could thus harass the Indian infantry, while the Phalanx kept them from going anywhere. The Indian infantry watched helpless while their cavalry was annihilated, and then driven back into the elephants

The elephant drivers urged their elephants to the defense of the cavalry. As they surged forward, the Palanx also surged forward, making the battle general. The elephants and cavalry pushed into Alexander's right wing of Phalanx, but were thrown back by Alexander's cavalry. Thus compressed, they became useless and died in great numbers. The elephants were pushed back into the mass of their own men and killed many Indians as they tried to go for the Greeks.

When the elephants did manage to rush the Greeks, they were still ineffective. The Phalanx had drilled a manuever which was rather effective against the elephants, simply opening a path for them to rush along. The elephant was then surrounded by javelineers, and would retreat back into the Indian lines, killing Indian troops as they went.

The elephants shattered the cohesion of the Indian line. Alexander's infantry, on the other hand, linked up shields and advanced in a shieldwall. The phalanx of spears pressed the cavalry against the slowly retreating Indian infantry, killing the last of them. The Indians, in disarray, fell back before Alexander's infantry, and were assaulted on both flanks by Alexander's cavalry.

When the battle had begun, Craterus started across the river. When the Indian force was enveloped by the Greek cavalry, they fled. Craterus was now in prime position to take over the pursuit of the tired, wounded, and dispirited Indians with his fresh troops.

The Indians lost roughly 3,000 cavalry and 12,000 infantry, with an additional 9,000 captured. All of their chariots were destroyed, and 80 elephants captured. The Macedonians lost 280 cavalry and 700 infantry.

Lessons. The lessons this battle teaches the SCA commander are relatively simple: 1) hide your numbers and your plans as much as possible, 2) unsupported charges are suicide, 3) cavalry is only effective with heavy infantry support, 4) psychological weapons are not effective against an enemy with high discipline. Lets take these one at a time.

Hide your numbers and your plans as much as possible. Obviously, if the enemy does not what you are doing, or where you are, or how many you have, he cannot respond effectively to your actions. In this battle, had Porus seen the squadrons cutting away from the main mass of cavalry, he would not have given them the opportunity to hit his cavalry in the rear. More likely, he would have charged the lone squadrons and turned them, then fallen on the Macedonian cavalry's left flank.

Unsupported charges are suicide. A charge which is not immediately supported is enveloped. The point of a charge is to push through the enemy, disordering him, and killing as you go. If there is not immediate support on the sides of the charging unit, the enemy folds in on the unit and envelopes it, more than making up for the carnage dealt during the charge.

Cavalry is only effective with heavey infantry support. Cavalry is mobile, and hits hard. However, without somebody to pin the unit that the cavalry is attacking, they cannot help but be thrown back or enfolded in the same manner as in an unsupported charge. When heavy infantry pins the enemy, however, the cavalry can disorder the enemy or envelope him. Coordination mutliplies the effective of both the cavalry and the heavy infantry. Porus's cavalry was unsupported, and died. Alexander's cavalry was well supported, and slaughtered Indians.

Psychological weapons are not effective against an enemy with high discipline. Elephants are massive, frightening beasts. They often turned the tide of battle in Indian wars, as they smashed through the lines with a great noise. Against the high discipline of the Macedonians, however, the elephants could do little. As they rushed into the infantry, the elephants were simply sidestepped. They rushed through, making little or no contact with the infantry. Meanwhile, they were attacked on all sides and made to retreat into their own troops. In general, good discipline and trust in an army's leadership can completely negate the effectiveness of all psychological weapons. Alexander wasn't worried by elephants, and the foot soldiers had trained in how to defeat them, so they weren't effective.

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