The Battle of Maldon, 991 C. E.

The combatants:
As many as 3,000 Vikings from Norway, led by Olaf Tryggvasson. These vikings were likely armed with round shields and swords, short spears, or axes. They were probably armored in a variety of gear, ranging from chainmail hauberks and full helms with nasals to rough leather jerkins and leather helms. Given the size of the force, and its successes all along the coast, it is unlikely that many were armed or armored in poor gear. Most Viking raiding parties did not employ archers, and there is evidence that archery was not a factor in this battle.

Byrhtnoth was the ealdorman of Essex. As such, he had a body of retainers and the right to call up local levies. There are no good reliable numbers of how many men he had with him at this battle. While the retainers would be armed and armored in a fashion similar to the Vikings, the levies were unlikely to be well outfitted. Most likely they were unarmored, and armed with spears, axes, and farming implements.

The battle:
Olaf Tryggvasson and his raiders, estimated to be about 3,000 men, arrived in Blackwater estuary East of Maldon. They landed on Northey Island, which was connected to the mainland by a causeway that was flooded except at low tide.

Byrhtnoth arrived on the mainland shore with his retainers and some local levies. While the tide was high, all that could cross the causeway were insults and demands that the Essex men give up their gold and silver. As the tide dropped, however, things began to change.

The causeway has only a narrow strip that can be crossed effectively. To either side of the strip is deep black mud. That meant that the Vikings could only come across the causeway in narrow columns, hampered by the wet ground and the bank of the mainland end of the causeway. Nonetheless, when the tide dropped, the Vikings began making their way across the causeway.

Byrhtnoth held the bank and was doing very well holding the Vikings at bay. Given the nature of the terrain, the Vikings could not flank the English, nor could they form their wedge and build momentum to carry them through the English ranks. They fought at a distinct disadvantage as they struggled to gain the bank, and that disadvantage was telling.

The Vikings had a choice: they could either get back into their boats and attempt a landing on the mainland shore, or try to fight their way against the odds onto the bank. Neither was that appealing. So instead, they called on the English to allow them to come ashore and fight fairly.

It’s not known precisely why Byrhtnoth chose to allow the Vikings to come ashore. Perhaps the fight was going so well that he thought he had superior troops to the Vikings. Perhaps he felt that it was only honorable to grant his opponents a fair fight. It is possible that he wanted to allow the Vikings onshore and then try to drive them back into the water, so he could beat them en-masse rather than in detail. Regardless of why he did it, Byrhtnoth allowed the Vikings to come ashore.

The fighting, once the Vikings were on shore, was no longer such a one-sided affair. Byrhtnoth’s troops fought well, but no longer had the huge advantage that they had so recently enjoyed. When Byrhtnoth was killed, his troops broke and ran. Even some of his retainers ran, an indication of how demoralized his troops were by the time he was killed. A few of his retainers took what they considered the only honorable road for them, and died seeking vengeance for their master.

Given that Olaf’s force was still sufficient to force Kent, Hampshire, and western England to pay danegild in exchange for peace, it is fair to say that Byrhtnoth did not have a significant impact on the size of the Viking force.

Conclusions:
Had Byrhtnoth maintained the advantage given him by the terrain, he would not necessarily have won the battle. It is pretty clear from the fact that he was unable to significantly reduce the size of Olaf’s forces that he was outnumbered. However, had he kept his advantage, he may have inflicted enough casualties on the Vikings that they could have been compelled to leave. Whether he did this because of ignorance of his advantage (which is hard to believe), an odd compulsion to give a superior force equal footing on which to fight, or because he believed that the “fair fight” might be some sort of champion’s battle, the fact remains that he gave up a crucial advantage. Centuries later, we see only a foolish mistake.



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